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Income Inequality and Child Mortality in Wealthy Nations 
Abstract 
This chapter presents evidence of a relationship between child mortality data and socio-economic 
factors in relatively wealthy nations.   The original study on child mortality which is reported here, 
and which first appeared in a UK medical journal, was undertaken in a School of Business by 
academics with an accounting and finance background.  The background to why academics from 
such a discipline were drawn to investigate these issues is given in the first part of the chapter.  The 
findings relating to child mortality data were found to be a special case of a wide range of social and 
health indicators which were systematically related to different approaches to the organisation of 
capitalist societies.  In particular, what have been called the “Anglo-American” countries show 
consistently poor outcomes over a number of indicators including child mortality.  Considerable 
evidence has been adduced in the literature to show the importance of income inequality as an 
explanation for such findings.  An important part of the chapter is the introduction and overview 
which it presents of a relatively recent publication in the epidemiological literature by Wilkinson and 
Pickett: their work is entitled “The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone”. 
 
The author of this chapter is an academic in a business school with a background in accounting and 
finance.  This is not a common background for a contribution to the “Hidden Hunger” conference on 
which this book is based.  Therefore the first part of this chapter will try to explain how the author’s 
interest in this area developed and how such a perspective may be relevant to child health (and that 
of wider society). 
Child mortality is, of course, an issue whose main focus is on the unacceptably high figures in poor 
countries.  However it is also a social indicator which is reported for the developed industrial 
countries and within those countries systematic variations exist. These variations correlate very 
closely to different “varieties of capitalism” and it is the contention of this chapter that these 
variations amount to a serious indictment of one form of capitalism in particular. 
What has been termed the “Anglo-American” or “stock-market” form of capitalism can be 
contrasted with what has been called “welfare” or “stakeholder capitalism” [1],[2],[3],[4].   An alternative 
and largely equivalent description of these broad classifications is given by Hall and Soskice[5] and 
Hall and Gingerich[6]. They used the terms “liberal market economies” (LMEs) and “co-ordinated 
market economies” (CMEs) respectively.   The former group, the LMEs, comprises Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US and, amongst this group, the UK and UK have been 
identified as relatively “pure” cases.  Amongst the CMEs, Germany, Austria, the Nordic countries and 
Japan are cited as being particularly characteristic of this type although the term arguably covers all 
the advanced economies that are not in the LME group.  These two groups of countries have also 
been distinguished by reference to their legal origins, with a “common law” framework being 
identified with Anglo-American socio-economic traditions and variations of a “civil law” approach 
being identified with those of the other countries. 
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What lies at the heart of the differences between these groups of countries is, it has been argued, 
the way that corporations operate within the legal frameworks and cultural traditions of the 
countries concerned.  In particular, the question: “in whose interests should companies be run?” is 
key to a fundamental distinction between the two broad forms of capitalism discussed above.  
Indeed Hall and Soskice, in a study[5]  intended to link comparative political economy with business 
studies, stated that they regard “companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy” [p.6].  
 
This important difference between corporate philosophies can be simply described: the Anglo-
American tradition is that companies should be run in the interests of shareholders (in other words 
they should be run so as to maximise shareholder value).  By contrast, the social market tradition is 
based on balancing the interests of a range of stakeholders.  Which of these two approaches is in the 
best interests of society as a whole may be seen as a political question, but it is also a question that 
can be very clearly informed by empirical evidence as discussed later in this chapter.    
However, in the author’s experience, this question is rarely considered or even acknowledged in the 
Anglo-American business culture.  Instead, the maximisation of shareholder value is taken for 
granted in the teaching of accounting and finance as the incontestable objective of corporations.   
 
Variations in accounting traditions reflect these traditional differences. In broad terms the German 
accounting tradition, for example, emphasises prudent valuations, protection for creditors, 
consequent limitations on dividends to shareholders and the retention of funds for reinvestment in 
the company.  Anglo-American accounting practices emphasise the provision of “decision useful 
information” to investors in order to help them maximise the returns from their share ownership.   
Typically these characteristics are accompanied by more distributions of funds to investors with 
commensurately less reinvestment in companies. 
 
The claimed superiority of the Anglo-American approach extends to international accounting 
standards. In a report by a UK professional body of accountants[7] it was argued that politicians 
should: “agree to give up their sovereignty over accounting standards in favour of an international 
but essentially private sector body” [p.16].  The private sector body in question is the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which evolved from its predecessor, the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC).  The formation of the IASC took place in 1973, the same year that the 
UK joined the European Economic Community (the forerunner of the European Union) and it has 
been claimed in the academic accounting literature that that the IASC was formed in order to resist 
the possible spread of a European accounting culture to the UK.   
 
Both the IASC and the IASB are widely perceived as spreading an Anglo American accounting culture 
through their standards.   In 2005, the chair of the European Parliament’s Economics and Monetary 
Affairs Committee stated that the role of the US-dominated IASB could lead to “the financialisation 
of the [world] economy” which could itself result in “management boards being more concerned 
about financial markets than about the true economic well-being of the company” [8]. 
 
The unquestioned superiority of the Anglo-American version of capitalism, and its approach to 
corporate governance in particular, has been a regular feature of the business media in LMEs.  
Continental European countries have been described as “overburdened by social security 
commitments … [and where] shareholder value cannot be released as aggressively …as in the US” [9].  
Financial Times (FT) editorials have prescribed for Japan “the discipline of modern management and 
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accounting” [10] and noted “social barriers” to “widespread restructuring” [11].  A report in the FT [12]  
described deregulation of European labour markets continuing at “snail’s pace” as “treasured social 
cohesion” impeded “a more robust, Anglo-Saxon style of capitalism”. An FT feature on the Japanese 
economy chastised Japan for its “cherished social contract”, noting that it was no longer viable and 
calling for “a more flexible labour market” [13]. 
 
The dismissive tone of such media comment regarding social criteria prompted the author and 
colleagues to make a comparative investigation into social outcomes.  The particular metric 
investigated was child mortality since the ability to nurture children seemed to be as good a single 
measure as any for assessing the health of a society.  And relevant data was also readily available 
from UNICEF.  The resulting study – of under 5 child mortality in the 24 richest OECD countries - was 
published in the Journal of Public Health [14].   
There were three key findings in that paper.  Firstly, when ranked by child mortality, the worst 
countries were the six described above as the Anglo-American LMEs. The worst of all were the two 
countries described (see above) as being the most pure cases of LMEs:  these were the US (8 deaths 
per thousand up to the age of 5) and the UK (with a figure of 6.5). The best six countries were the 
Nordic countries and Japan (Sweden was best with a figure of 3.25). The next 12 countries in terms 
of performance comprised continental European countries and the Republic of Korea, with rates 
from 5 to 5.5.  These figures were four year averages for the years 2001-2004 based on the UNICEF 
surveys published in the years 2003-2006 respectively.   
 
The second main finding was that there was a very strong correlation (significant at the 0.1 per cent 
level) between the child mortality figures and measures of income inequality.   
Thirdly, the relative ranking of the LMEs had deteriorated over time.  The UNICEF figures allowed a 
longitudinal analysis to be made and it was clear that, several decades earlier, the Anglo American 
countries had occupied middle or upper positions in the equivalent relative ranking (it should be 
noted that all countries had improved their absolute performance). This period of worsening relative 
performance has seen the development of neo-liberalism and the increasingly shrill, Anglo-
American, emphasis on maximising returns to shareholders. 
 
More correlations between income inequality and poor health and social indicators  
 
During the course of the work reported in the Journal of Public Health[14), it became apparent to the 
authors that child mortality was a special case of a much more general phenomenon amongst 
relatively wealthy countries, whereby income inequality had been shown to be strongly correlated 
with a wide range of social indicators.  In this context the work of the social epidemiologist Richard 
Wilkinson has been particularly important and influential.  In their recent book entitled The Spirit 
Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone[15], Wilkinson and Pickett summarise much of the work 
that has been done in this area by themselves and others.  As with the child mortality study reported 
above, the correlations they report concern the relatively rich developed economies.  In addition to 
child mortality they show “a strong relationship between inequality and many different health 
outcomes”.  These outcomes include:  life expectancy, teenage births, obesity, mental illness, drug & 
alcohol addiction, homicides, imprisonment levels, trust, attainment in maths and literacy, and social 
mobility.  Figure 1 reports the relationship between income inequality and an index based on each of 
these indicators. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
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It should be noted that, amongst the countries studied, neither health nor social problems are 
correlated to national income per head – see Figure 2.   Social and health outcomes are indeed 
related to per capita income as it rises from poverty levels to those of the developed countries, but 
there comes a point, beyond the “epidemiological transition”, when further increases in income 
have no observable effect.  Beyond that point what matters is the income distribution within 
countries, rather than between countries.  The US provides a clear example of a country with a very 
high level of per capita income but with particularly poor health and social outcomes. 
 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Another key point, emphasised by Wilkinson and Pickett, is demonstrated in Figure 3 below.   
 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The research summarised in Figure 3 exemplifies a common finding that relatively better indicators 
in less unequal countries are not only found amongst the least well-off levels of society, but can 
persist across  all levels. This finding is reflected in the subtitle of the work by Wilkinson and 
Pickett[15] which reads “Why Equality is Better for Everyone”.  
 
 
Evidence on causation 
 
Differing health outcomes which are correlated with income inequality (based, typically, on 
international comparisons and also on comparisons of US states) might immediately lead to the 
inference that differences in material well-being are the fundamental cause.   But the evidence of 
poorer outcomes occurring at all levels of society in more unequal countries, and the lack of 
correlations with per capita incomes, point to a less obvious, but perhaps an even more important, 
source of causation.  Wilkinson and Pickett argue that the “biology of chronic stress is a plausible 
pathway which helps us to understand why unequal societies are almost always unhealthy societies” 
[p.87].   
 
The details of their findings regarding causation go beyond the scope of this chapter but Wilkinson 
and Pickett cite a range of studies from different cultural contexts which support their argument.   
Physiological evidence is also adduced whereby psychosocial factors affect, in turn, the psyche, the 
neural system and the immune system.  In particular, significant evidence is based on the effects of 
two hormones, cortisol and oxytocin. 
 
This chapter was motivated by an investigation into child mortality and it seems appropriate to 
return to that issue to update the evidence on relative figures that were reported by Collison et 
al.[14].   The most recent equivalent data based on averaging UNICEF’s figures for 2011 and 2012 still 
show a similar picture to those for 2001-2004 with five of the bottom six places occupied by the 
Anglo-American countries – the exception being Ireland which has improved its relative position.  
The top places are still occupied by mainly Nordic countries, together with Japan and now also 
Luxembourg.   Again it should be emphasised that all 24 countries have improved in absolute terms.  
The complete listing in ascending order of the average 2011-2012 child mortality figures is as 
follows:  Iceland (2.25), Luxembourg (2.6), Sweden (2.9), Finland (2.95), Norway (3.05), Japan (3.20), 
Portugal (3.7), Denmark (3.85), Italy (3.85), Germany (4.00), Ireland (4.00) , Netherlands (4.00), 
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France (4.05), Austria (4.10), Belgium (4.15), Switzerland (4.20), Republic of Korea (4.25), Spain 
(4.60), Greece (4.7), Australia (4.9), UK (5.05), Canada (5.3), New Zealand (5.95), USA (7.25). 
 
In the light of the evidence cited above one might ask why the Anglo-American business culture is 
held up as an example to follow.  Arguably this is simply because of the influence of dominant vested 
interests, as reflected in some of the examples drawn from the FT.  Such influence is not new; 
indeed Adam Smith, who has been called the “father of economics”, stated in his famous work “The 
Wealth of Nations” [16] that: "the clamour and sophistry of merchants and manufacturers easily 
persuade ... that the private interest of a part, and of a subordinate part of the society is the general 
interest of the whole” [Bk. I, Ch. X, Pt. II, p. 101]. 
 
Finally and, I would argue, regrettably, there is evidence to suggest that of the two kinds of 
capitalism outlined above, it is the Anglo-American version that is spreading to other societies, 
rather than vice versa.  A review of that evidence is beyond the scope of this chapter but, to cite one 
example, in a 2003 study Christel Lane[17] concluded that Germany: “is in the process of converging 
towards the Anglo-American model” [p.79] which would have “far-reaching practical consequences 
… increasing the level of social inequality in German society” [p.98].   She also argued that such 
change is not inevitable.  I hope that greater awareness of the social evidence will make such a 
process less likely in Germany and elsewhere, and even help to reverse it. 
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Figure 1 [adapted from Wilkinson and Pickett [15], p.20] 
 
 
 
Figure 2 [adapted from Wilkinson and Pickett [15], p.21] 
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Figure 3 [adapted from Wilkinson and Pickett [15], p.179] 
 
